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Active Target Defense Differential Game with a Fast Defender
Eloy Garcia, David W. Casbeer, and Meir Pachter
Abstract— This paper addresses the active target defense
differential game where an Attacker missile pursues a Target
aircraft. A Defender missile is fired by the Target’s wingman
in order to intercept the Attacker before it reaches the aircraft.
Thus, a team is formed by the Target and the Defender which
cooperate to maximize the distance between the Target aircraft
and the point where the Attacker missile is intercepted by
the Defender missile, while the Attacker tries to minimize
said distance. The results shown here extend previous work.
We consider here the case where the Defender is faster than
the Attacker. The solution to this differential game provides
optimal heading angles for the Target and the Defender team to
maximize the terminal separation between Target and Attacker
and it also provides the optimal heading angle for the Attacker
to minimize the said distance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuit-evasion scenarios involving multiple agents rep-
resent important and challenging types of problems in
aerospace, control, and robotics. They are also useful in order
to analyze biologically inspired behaviors. For instance, the
paper [1] addressed a scenario where two evaders employ
coordinated strategies to evade a single pursuer, but also to
keep them close to each other. The authors of [2] discussed
a multi-player pursuit-evasion game with line segment ob-
stacles labeled as the Prey, Protector, and Predator Game.
Dominance regions were provided for each agent in order
to solve the game, that is, to determine if the Protector
is able to rescue the Prey before the Predator captures it.
A different approach to address pursuit-evasion games with
several pursuers in order to capture an evader within a
bounded domain is based on dynamic Voronoi diagrams, as
in [3] and [4].
An scenario of active target defense including three agents,
the Target (T ), the Defender (D), and the Attacker (A),
has been analyzed in the context of cooperative optimal
control [5], [6]. Indeed, sensing capabilities of missiles and
aircraft allow for implementation of complex pursuit and
evasion strategies [7], [8], and recent work has proposed
different guidance laws for the agents A and D. In [9] the
authors addressed the case where the Defender implements
Command to the Line of Sight (CLOS) guidance to pursue
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the Attacker which requires the Defender to have at least
the same speed as the Attacker. A different guidance law for
the Target-Attacker-Defender (TAD) scenario was given by
Yamasaki et.al. [10], [11]. These authors investigated an in-
terception method called Triangle Guidance (TG), where the
objective is to command the defending missile to be on the
line-of-sight between the attacking missile and the aircraft
for all time while the aircraft follows some predetermined
trajectory. The authors show, through simulations, that TG
provides better performance in terms of Defender control
effort than a number of variants of Proportional Navigation
(PN) guidance laws, that is, when the Defender uses PN
to pursue the Attacker instead of TG. These approaches
constrain and limit the level of cooperation between the
Target and the Defender by implementing Defender guidance
laws without regard to the Target’s trajectory.
The papers [12], [13] presented an analysis of the end-
game TAD scenario based on the Attacker/Target miss dis-
tance for a non-cooperative Target/Defender. The authors
develop linearization-based Attacker maneuvers in order to
evade the Defender and continue pursuing the Target.
Different types of cooperation have been recently proposed
in [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20] for the TAD scenario.
In these papers the Target represents an aircraft trying to
evade a missile homing on it. The Defender represents an-
other missile launched by the aircraft (or a wingman) in order
to intercept and destroy the Attacker in order to guarantee
the survival of the aircraft. Thus, in [16] optimal policies
(lateral acceleration for each agent including the Attacker)
are provided for the case of an aggressive Defender, that
is, the Defender has a definite maneuverability advantage.
A linear quadratic optimal control problem is posed where
the Defender’s control effort weight is driven to zero to
increase its aggressiveness. Reference [17] provided a game
theoretical analysis of the TAD problem using different
guidance laws for both the Attacker and the Defender. The
cooperative strategies in [18] allow for a maneuverability
disadvantage for the Defender with respect to the Attacker
and the results show that the optimal Target maneuver is
either constant or arbitrary. In the recent paper [20] the
authors analyze different types of cooperation assuming the
Attacker is oblivious of the Defender and its guidance law is
known. Two different one-way cooperation strategies were
discussed: when the Defender acts independently, the Target
knows its future behavior and cooperates with the Defender,
and vice versa. Two-way cooperation where both Target and
Defender communicate continuously to exchange their states
and controls is also addressed, and it is shown to have a
better performance than the other types of cooperation - as
expected.
Our preliminary work [21], [22] considered the cases
when the Attacker implements typical guidance laws of Pure
Pursuit (PP) and PN, respectively. In these papers, the Target-
Defender team solves an optimal control problem that returns
the optimal strategy for the T −D team so that D intercepts
the Attacker and at the same time the separation between
Target and Attacker at the instant of interception of A by D
is maximized.
In this paper the active target defense scenario is modeled
as a zero-sum three-agent pursuit-evasion differential game.
The two-agent team consists of a Target and a Defender
who cooperate; the Attacker is the opposition. The goal
of the Attacker is to capture the Target while the Target
tries to evade the Attacker and avoid capture. The Target
cooperates with the Defender which pursues and tries to
intercept the Attacker before the latter captures the Target.
Cooperation between the Target and the Defender is such
that the Defender will capture the Attacker before the latter
reaches the Target. In this differential game the Attacker also
solves an optimal control problem in order to minimize the
final separation between itself and the Target. Assuming that
the Attacker knows the position of the Defender, this strategy
provides better performance for the Attacker than using PP or
PN. From the Attacker’s point of view, it is better to bring the
Defender-Attacker interception point closer to the Target’s
position (and hopefully produce some damage), even though
the Attacker is then captured by the Defender. The present
paper extends the results in [23] where it was assumed that
both missiles, the Attacker and the Defender, have the same
speed. Here, we extend the analysis of this differential game
to include the operationally relevant case where the Attacker
and the Defender missiles have different speeds; the focus
of this paper is on the case where the Defender is faster
than the Attacker. This scenario is more complex than the
previously considered particular case of same speeds. Here,
we derive the optimal strategies for each one of the three
agents. In addition, given a Defender-Attacker speed ratio we
provide the critical Target/Attacker speed ratio to guarantee
its survival.
We also obtain the analytical solutions of the differential
game, and give special attention to the case where the Target
starts closer to the Attacker than to the Defender. For this
scenario we also provide the critical minimal speed of the
Target for it to avoid capture; that is, when the Target starts
closer to the Attacker than to the Defender, its speed must be
bounded from below; otherwise the Target will be captured
by the Attacker before the Defender can get in the way of
the Attacker and intercept it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II states the
active target defense differential game. Section III provides
a numerical method to solve the differential game. The
minimum Target speed ratio to evade capture by the Attacker
is given in Section IV. Analytical solutions of the differential
game are provided in Section V. Examples are given in
Section VI and concluding remarks are made in Section VII.
Fig. 1. Reduced state space
II. DIFFERENTIAL GAME
The target defense differential game is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The speeds of the Target, Attacker, and Defender are denoted
by VT , VA, and VD , respectively, which are assumed to be
constant. The agents have “simple motion” a la Isaacs. The
dynamics of the three vehicles in the realistic game space
are given by:
x˙T = VT cos φˆ, y˙T = VT sin φˆ (1)
x˙A = VA cos χˆ, y˙A = VA sin χˆ (2)
x˙D = VD cos ψˆ, y˙D = VD sin ψˆ (3)
where the headings of the Target, the Attacker, and the
Defender are, respectively, φˆ = φ + λ, χˆ = λ+θ−χ, and
ψˆ = ψ + θ + λ− pi.
The variables R and r represent the separation between
the Attacker and the Target and between the Attacker and the
Defender, respectively. In this game the Attacker pursues the
Target and tries to capture it. The Target and the Defender
cooperate in order for the Defender to intercept the Attacker
before the latter captures the Target. Thus, the Target-
Defender team search for a cooperative optimal strategy
to maximize R(tf ) which represents the distance between
the Target and the Attacker at the time instant tf of the
Defender capturing the Attacker. The Attacker will search
for its corresponding optimal strategy in order to minimize
R(tf ).
Define the speed ratio problem parameter α = VT /VA.
In general, we have that the Attacker missile is faster than
the Target aircraft, so α < 1. Let us define the speed ratio
β = VD/VA. When the Defender is faster than the Attacker
we have that β > 1.
III. NUMERICAL SOLUTION
In this section, the corresponding dynamics of the three-
agent engagement will be modeled using the reduced state
space formed by the ranges R and r, and by the angle
between them, denoted by θ see Fig. 1. The objective
of the Target-Defender team is to determine their optimal
heading angles φ and ψ in this reduced state space such
that the distance R(tf ) is maximized at the time instant
tf where the separation r(tf ) = rc, where rc denotes the
Defender’s capture radius. The interception time tf is free.
The objective of the Attacker is to determine its optimal
heading angle, denoted by χ, such that the distance R(tf )
is minimized. Note that the relative heading angles can be
easily transformed to heading angles with respect to the
fixed coordinate axis x using the line of sight angle from
the Attacker to the Target, denoted by λ. The use of the
reduced state space provides a compact representation of the
dynamics of this three-agent differential game.
The (normalized with respect to the speed VA) dynamics
in the reduced state space are
R˙ = α cosφ− cos(θ − χ), R(t0) = R0 (4)
r˙ = − cosχ− β cosψ, r(t0) = r0 (5)
θ˙ = −α
R
sinφ+
1
R
sin(θ − χ)
− β
r
sinψ +
1
r
sinχ, θ(t0) = θ0 (6)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ tf .
The objective of the Target-Defender team is to maximize
the separation between the Target and the Attacker at the
interception time R(tf ), where the terminal time tf is free,
such that r(tf ) = rc. The objective of the Attacker is to
minimize the same distance R(tf ). This can be expressed as
max
φ,ψ
min
χ
J =
∫ tf
t0
R˙dt. (7)
Then, the Hamiltonian is given by (where the Target-
Defender team aims at minimizing −J and the Attacker
aims at maximizing −J , for convenience of notation of the
solutions):
H= cos(θ − χ)− α cosφ
+ (α cosφ− cos(θ − χ))λR
− (cosχ+ β cosψ)λr
+ (− αR sinφ+ 1R sin(θ−χ)− βr sinψ+ 1r sinχ)λθ
(8)
and the co-state dynamics are given by:
λ˙R =
λθ
R2
(sin(θ − χ)− α sinφ) (9)
λ˙r =
λθ
r2
(sinχ− β sinψ) (10)
λ˙θ = (1− λR) sin(θ − χ)− λθ
R
cos(θ − χ). (11)
The terminal conditions for this free terminal time problem
are as follows. The terminal state r(tf ) is fixed and equal
to rc. Because the terminal states R(tf ), and θ(tf ) are
free, we have λR(tf ) = λθ(tf ) = 0. The final termi-
nal condition for optimality for this problem requires that
H(x∗(tf ), u
∗(tf ), λ
∗(tf ), tf ) = 0. In summary, the terminal
conditions are:
r(tf ) = rc
λR(tf )= 0
λθ(tf )= 0
α2+2
(
αβ+cos θ(tf )
)
λr(tf ) + (β
2 − 1)λ2r(tf )− 1= 0.
(12)
Proposition 1: The Target and Defender optimal control
headings that maximize the separation between the Target
and the Attacker and achieve r(tf ) = rc are given by
sinψ∗ =
λθ
r
√
λ2r + λ
2
θ/r
2
(13)
cosψ∗ =
λr√
λ2r + λ
2
θ/r
2
(14)
sinφ∗ =
λθ
R
√
(1−λR)2+λ2θ/R2
(15)
cosφ∗ =
1− λR√
(1− λR)2 + λ2θ/R2
. (16)
The Attacker optimal control heading that minimizes the
separation between itself and the Target at t = tf is given
by
sinχ∗ =
χs√
χ2s + χ
2
c
(17)
cosχ∗ =
χc√
χ2s + χ
2
c
(18)
where χs = (1 − λR) sin θ − λθR cos θ + λθr and χc = (1 −
λR) cos θ +
λθ
R sin θ − λr.
Proof. In order to find the optimal heading angle equations
involving ψ∗ we solve for this variable by differentiating the
Hamiltonian (8) in ψ and setting the derivative to 0
∂H
∂ψ
= βλr sinψ − β
r
λθ cosψ = 0. (19)
Using the trigonometric identity cos2 ψ = 1− sin2 ψ we can
write (19) as
sin2 ψ =
λ2θ
r2(λ2r + λ
2
θ/r
2)
and (13) follows. The expression (14) is found in a similar
way by letting sin2 ψ = 1− cos2 ψ in (19). We can compute
the second partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect
to ψ to show that this solution minimizes the cost −J . Doing
so we obtain
∂2H
∂ψ2 = βλr cosψ +
β
r λθ sinψ
=
βλ2r√
λ2r+λ
2
θ
/r2
+
βλ2θ
r2
√
λ2r+λ
2
θ
/r2
> 0
(20)
which means that ψ∗ minimizes the cost −J ; equivalently,
it maximizes the final separation R(tf ).
The optimal heading of the Target can be found in a similar
way. Let us evaluate
∂H
∂φ
= α(1− λR) sinφ− α
R
λθ cosφ = 0. (21)
We use the trigonometric identity cos2 φ = 1 − sin2 φ to
write (21) as
sin2 φ∗ =
λ2θ
R2
(
(1−λR)2+λ2θ/R2
)
and we obtain (15). The expression (16) is found in a similar
way by setting sin2 φ = 1 − cos2 φ in (21). Similarly, we
compute
∂2H
∂φ2 = α(1− λR) cosφ+ αRλθ sinφ
= α(1−λR)
2√
(1−λR)2+λ2θ/R
2
+
αλ2θ
R2
√
(1−λR)2+λ2θ/R
2
> 0
(22)
which means that φ∗ minimizes the cost −J ; equivalently,
it maximizes the final separation R(tf )
The optimal heading χ∗ is characterized in a similar
way. We differentiate the Hamiltonian (8) in χ and set the
derivative to 0
∂H
∂χ = (1− λR) sin(θ − χ) + λr sinχ
− λθR cos(θ − χ) + λθr cosχ = 0.
(23)
Using the trigonometric identities:
sin(θ − χ) = sin θ cosχ− cos θ sinχ (24)
cos(θ − χ) = cos θ cosχ+ sin θ sinχ (25)
we can write (23) as follows:(
(1 − λR) sin θ − λθR cos θ + λθr
)
cosχ
=
(
(1− λR) cos θ + λθR sin θ − λr
)
sinχ.
(26)
We now use the trigonometric identity cos2 χ = 1 − sin2 χ
to obtain
sin2 χ∗ =
χ2s
χ2s + χ
2
c
and (17) follows. The expression (18) is found in a similar
way by setting sin2 χ = 1− cos2 χ in (26).
In order to guarantee that the Attacker optimal control
maximizes the objective −J we evaluate the second partial
derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the Attacker
control input.
∂2H
∂χ2 = −(1− λR) cos(θ − χ) + λr cosχ
− λθR sin(θ − χ)− λθr sinχ.
(27)
Inserting the expressions (24) and (25) into eq. (27) we
obtain the following
∂2H
∂χ2 = −
(
(1− λR) sin θ − λθR cos θ + λθr
)
sinχ
− ((1− λR) cos θ + λθR sin θ − λr
)
cosχ < 0.
(28)
Therefore, the solutions (17) and (18) maximize the objective
−J , which is equivalent to minimize the terminal separation
R(tf ). 
The expressions for the optimal heading angles (13)-(18)
are used to numerically solve the Two-Point Boundary Value
Problem (TPBVP) (4)-(7), (9)-(18). The numerical solution
is found by substituting the optimal control headings into the
state equations (4)-(6), and the co-state equations (9)-(11),
with the terminal conditions given by (12).
IV. CRITICAL SPEED RATIO FOR TARGET SURVIVAL
In this section we consider point capture, that is, the
separation r has to satisfy r(tf ) → 0 in order for the
Defender to capture the Attacker. The scenario is illustrated
in Fig. 2. We consider the rotating reference frame anchored
on the Attacker and the Defender. In Fig. 2 the points A and
D represent the positions of the Attacker and the Defender,
respectively. A Cartesian frame is attached to the points A
and D in such a way that the extension to infinity of AD
in both directions represents the X-axis and the orthogonal
bisector of AD represents the Y -axis. The positions of the
three agents in this frame are T = (xT , yT ), A = (xA, 0),
and D = (−xA, 0).
Fig. 2. Target-Attacker-Defender scenario for γ < 1
With respect to Fig. 2 we note that the Attacker aims
at minimizing the distance between the Target at the time
instant when the Defender intercepts the Attacker, point T ′,
and point I , where the Defender intercepts the Attacker. The
points T and T ′ represent the initial and terminal positions
of the Target, respectively.
Define γ = 1/β = VA/VD. When γ < 1 the Defender
will intercept the Attacker at some point I = (xI , yI) that
lies on the Apollonius circle defined by the Defender and
the Attacker separation and the speed ratio γ. The center of
the DA-based Apollonius circle is at (a, 0), where
a =
1 + γ2
1− γ2xA (29)
and the radius of the DA Apollonius circle is
rA =
2γ
1− γ2xA. (30)
When the Target is inside the DA Apollonius circle, its
speed needs to be high enough in order to exit from the
DA Apollonius circle before being captured by the Attacker.
If the Target is able to exit the DA Apollonius circle then
the Defender will be able to assist the Target to escape, by
intercepting the Attacker who is on route to the Target.
Proposition 2: Given the speed ratio γ = VA/VD < 1,
the critical speed ratio α¯ is a function of the positions of the
Target and the Attacker and is given by
α¯ =
γ
√
(xA + xT )2 + y2T −
√
(xA − xT )2 + y2T
2γxA
. (31)
Proof. In order to determine the minimum speed ratio,
α¯, that guarantees Target survival we consider a second
Apollonius circle defined by the Attacker and the Target
using the Target/Attacker speed ratio α. Thus, a solution to
the differential game exists if and only if the AT Apollonius
circle, which is based on the segment AT and the speed ratio
α, intersects the DA Apollonius circle, the one based on the
the segment DA and the speed ratio γ. The lower limit α¯
on the speed ratio α, that is, α¯ < α < 1, corresponds to
the case where the AT Apollonius circle is tangent to the
DA Apollonius circle, see Fig. 3. Note that if the speed
Fig. 3. Determination of α¯
ratio α ≥ 1 the Target always escapes and there is no need
for a Defender missile, that is, there is no target defense
differential game in the first place.
The Attacker’s initial position, the Target’s initial position,
and the center O of the AT Apollonius circle are collinear
and lie on the dotted line in Fig. 3 which can be represented
as
y = − yT
xA − xT x+
xAyT
xA − xT .
The geometry of the second Apollonius circle is as follows:
The center of the circle, denoted by O, is at a distance of
α2
1−α2 d from T and its radius is rO =
α
1−α2 d, where d is the
distance between A and T and is given by
d =
√
(xA − xT )2 + y2T . (32)
Hence, the following holds( xT yT
xA − xT −
yT
xA − xT x0
)2
+ (x0 − xT )2
=
α4
(1− α2)2 [(xA − xT )
2 + y2T ]
and we calculate the coordinates of the center of the second
Apollonius circle
xO =
1
1−α2 xT − α
2
1−α2 xA
yO =
1
1−α2 yT .
(33)
From Fig. 3 we can see that the three points a, O, and I are
collinear, where I represents the tangent point where both
circles meet. Thus, we have the following relationship
rO = rA − q (34)
where q =
√
(a− xO)2 + y2O . Eq. (34) can be written as
follows
(a− xO)2 + y2O = (rA −
α
1− α2 d)
2. (35)
Eq. (35) can be expressed in terms of the known positions
(xT , yT , and xA), the known speed ratio γ, and the variable
we aim to solve for, which is α. After a few steps we obtain
the following quartic equation in α
4γ2
1−γ2x
2
Aα
4 + 4γd1−γ2xAα
3
−
(
4γ2
1−γ2x
2
A +
4γ2
1−γ2xAxT − d2
)
α2
− 4γd1−γ2xAα+ 4γ
2
1−γ2xAxT − d2 = 0
(36)
which can be factored out to obtain the quadratic polynomials(
4γxAα(γxAα+ d) + (1− γ2)d2 − 4γ2xAxT
)(
α2 − 1)
= 0.
The solutions α = ±1 are irrelevant to the differential game
under analysis. Thus, the critical speed ratio α¯ is given by
the positive solution of the quadratic equation
4γ2x2Aα
2 + 4γxAdα+ (1 − γ2)d2 − 4γ2xAxT = 0
which is given by (31). 
In the particular case where yT = 0, the critical speed
ratio is given by
α¯ =
xA(γ − 1) + xT (γ + 1)
2γxA
. (37)
Further, the initial Target position (xT , 0) for which the
critical α¯ is equal to zero can be obtained from (37)
0 =
xA(γ − 1) + xT (γ + 1)
2γxA
⇒ xT = (1− γ)xA
1 + γ
(38)
which is equivalent to
a− rA = 1 + γ
2
1− γ2xA −
2γ
1− γ2xA =
(1 − γ)xA
1 + γ
,
as expected.
V. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
When γ < 1 the Defender will intercept the Attacker at
some point I = (xI , yI) that lies on the DA Apollonius
circle. Notice that all points outside theDA Apollonius circle
can be reached by the Defender before the Attacker does;
similarly, all points inside the same circle can be reached by
the Attacker before the Defender does.
A. Target Starts Outside of DA Apollonius Circle
In the case where the Target is initially outside the DA
Apollonius circle it can be clearly seen that the Defender
can help the Target regardless of the speed ratio 0 < α <
1 because the Attacker cannot reach the Target before the
Defender does. In other words, the critical speed ratio in
this case is α¯ = 0. In the case where the Target is outside
the DA Apollonius circle, the Target chooses point v on the
DA Apollonius circle (in order to run away from that point)
and the Attacker chooses his aimpoint u on the same circle.
Additionally, the Defender tries to intercept the Attacker by
choosing his aimpoint w, also on the DA Apollonius circle.
The Target, the Defender, and the Attacker are faced with
the minmax optimization problem: minumaxv,w J(u, v, w),
where J(u, v, w) = S and S represents the distance between
the Target terminal position T ′ and the point on the DA
Apollonius circle where the Attacker is intercepted by the
Defender.
Fig. 4. Optimal strategy
The Defender helps the Target to escape by intercepting
the Attacker at the point u on the DA Apollonius circle.
Therefore, the Defender’s optimal policy is w∗(u, v) = u
in order to guarantee interception of the Attacker. Since
the Defender’s optimal policy is w∗ = u we have that the
decision variables u and v jointly determine J(u, v), where
J(u, v) = S and S represents the distance between the
Target terminal position T ′ and the point I = u on the DA
Apollonius circle where the Attacker is intercepted by the
Defender.
Proposition 3: Given the cost/payoff function J(u, v),
the solution u∗ and v∗ of the optimization problem
minu maxv J(u, v) is such that
u∗ = v∗.
Moreover, when the Target is outside the DA Apollonius
circle, the Target’s strategy is v∗(u) = argmaxv J(u, v) = u
so that it suffices to solve the optimization problem
minxI ,yI J(xI , yI)
subject to (a− xI)2 + y2I = r2A (39)
where
J(xI , yI) =
√
(xI − xT )2 + (yI − yT )2
+ α
√
(xA − xI)2 + y2I .
(40)

The Attacker chooses the optimal coordinates (xI , yI) of
point I that minimize the final separation J(xI , yI) = IT +
TT ′ see Fig. 4.
One way to formulate this problem is as shown in Propo-
sition 3. The equality constraint can be used in the cost to
write J(xI), that is, to write the cost in terms of only one
variable. For instance, the first derivative ∂J(xI)∂xI = 0 results
in a sixth order equation in xI .
Theorem 1: The optimal interception point I that mini-
mizes (40) has polar coordinates I = (ϕ∗, rA) with respect to
the center of the DA Apollonius circle denoted by a, where
ϕ∗ is the solution of the sixth order complex exponential
equation
NrA
l
(
1− Nα2Ml
)
e6iϕ
+
(
( NαMl )
2(r2A +M
2)− r2A −N2
)
e5iϕ
+NrA
(
N
α2Ml2 (2l
2 − 1) + l − 2l
)
e4iϕ
+2
(
r2A +N
2 − ( NαM )2(r2A +M2)
)
e3iϕ
+NrA
(
N
α2M (2− l2)− 2l+ 1l
)
e2iϕ
+
(
( NlαM )
2(r2A +M
2)− r2A −N2
)
eiϕ
+NrAl
(
1− Nlα2M
)
= 0
(41)
that minimizes the cost
J(ϕ) =
√
r2A +N
2 − 2NrA cos(ϕ− λ)
+ α
√
r2A +M
2 − 2MrA cosϕ (42)
where l = eiλ, M = 2γ
2
1−γ2xA represents the distance
between the points A and a, and N =
√
(a− xT )2 + y2T
represents the distance between the points a and T .
Proof. An alternative and more compact algebraic equation
to directly solving (40) can be obtained by searching for the
optimal angle ϕ that minimizes the same cost see Fig. 4.
It can be seen that, by varying the angle ϕ, the point I
moves along the circumference of the DA Apollonius circle.
In order to write an equivalent expression to (40), but only in
terms of ϕ, we consider the two triangles ∆aAI and ∆aT I .
The distance TT ′ is proportional to the distance AI .
The distance AI changes as the angle ϕ takes different
values. However, the distance aI = rA and the distance
aA = 2γ
2
1−γ2xA are fixed. Similarly, the distance IT changes
in terms of the angle ϕ, but the distance aI , the distance aT ,
and the angle λ are fixed. Then, the cost (40) can be written
as in (42)
The first derivative of (42) is
dJ(ϕ)
dϕ =
N sin(ϕ−λ)√
r2A+N
2
−2NrA cos(ϕ−λ)
+ αM sinϕ√
r2
A
+M2−2MrA cosϕ
.
(43)
Setting (43) equal to zero we obtain
N2 sin2(ϕ−λ)
r2A+N
2
−2NrA cos(ϕ−λ)
= α
2M2 sin2 ϕ
r2A+M
2
−2MrA cosϕ
. (44)
In order to solve for the angle ϕ we use the complex
exponential eiϕ to obtain
N2
4
(
ei(ϕ−λ)−e−i(ϕ−λ))2(r2A+M2−MrA(eiϕ+e−iϕ)) =
α2M2
4
(
eiϕ−e−iϕ)2(r2A+N2−NrA(ei(ϕ−λ) + e−i(ϕ−λ))).
(45)
After some manipulation we obtain a sixth order polynomial
equation in eiϕ as it is shown in (41).
The polynomial in (41) has complex coefficients. The six
solutions of (41) are complex, in general, of the form eiϕ =
cosϕ + i sinϕ. Thus, the angle ϕ can be directly obtained.
In the worst case, we only need to test the six angles in the
cost function to determine the optimal solution ϕ∗. 
B. Target Starts Inside of DA Apollonius Circle
In the case where the Target is inside the DA Apollo-
nius circle, the Target chooses his aimpoint v on the DA
Apollonius circle and the Attacker chooses his aimpoint
u on the same circle. Additionally, the Defender tries to
intercept the Attacker by choosing his aimpoint w, also
on the DA Apollonius circle. The Target, the Defender,
and the Attacker are faced with the maxmin optimization
problem: maxv,wminu J(u, v, w), where J(u, v, w) = S
and S represents the distance between the Target terminal
position T ′ and the point on the DA Apollonius circle where
the Attacker is intercepted by the Defender.
The Defender’s optimal policy is w∗(u, v) = u in order
to guarantee interception of the Attacker and the decision
variables u and v jointly determine J(u, v). Now, let us
analyze the possible strategies. If the Target chooses v, the
Attacker will respond and choose u. If u 6= v the Target
would correct his decision and choose some v¯ such that
S¯ > S as shown in Fig. 5. In general, choosing u 6= v
is detrimental to the Attacker since the resulting cost will
increase. Thus, it is clear that the Attacker should aim at the
point v which is chosen by the Target.
Proposition 4: Given the cost/payoff function J(u, v),
the solution u∗ and v∗ of the optimization problem
maxv minu J(u, v) is such that
u∗ = v∗.
Moreover, when the Target is inside the DA Apollonius
circle, the Attacker’s strategy is u∗(v) = argminu J(u, v) =
v so that it suffices to solve the optimization problem
maxxI ,yI J(xI , yI)
subject to (a− xI)2 + y2I = r2A (46)
where
J(xI , yI) = α
√
(xA − xI)2 + y2I
−
√
(xI − xT )2 + (yI − yT )2. (47)

The difference between the Target being inside or outside
the DA Apollonius circle is not only the sign in the cost
function but the Target and Attacker strategies. In the case
treated in this subsection, the Target chooses the coordinates
(xI , yI) that maximize the final separation J(xI , yI) and the
Attacker follows the Target’s decision. Additionally, when
the Target is inside the DA Apollonius circle its critical
speed is α¯ > 0 (given by (31)); when the Target is outside
the same circle then its critical speed is α = 0.
Theorem 2: The optimal interception point I that maxi-
mizes (47) has polar coordinates I = (ϕ∗, rA) with respect to
the center of the DA Apollonius circle denoted by a, where
ϕ∗ is the solution of the sixth order complex exponential
equation (41) that maximizes the cost
J(ϕ) = α
√
r2A +M
2 − 2MrA cosϕ
−
√
r2A +N
2 − 2NrA cos(ϕ− λ) (48)
where l = eiλ, M represents the distance between the points
A and a, and N represents the distance between the points
a and T .
Proof. The cost (47) can be written in terms of the angle
ϕ as in (48). The first derivative of (48) is
dJ(ϕ)
dϕ =
αM sinϕ√
r2A+M
2
−2MrA cosϕ
− N sin(ϕ−λ)√
r2
A
+N2−2NrA cos(ϕ−λ)
.
(49)
Fig. 5. maxmin optimization problem
Setting (49) equal to zero we obtain (44) and, consequently,
the optimal angle ϕ∗ is the solution of (41) that maximizes
(48). 
VI. EXAMPLES
Example 1. Target is outside the DA Apollonius circle. The
speed ratios are α = 0.25 and γ = 0.8. The initial conditions
of the three agents are given by: A = (4, 0), D = (−4, 0),
and T = (0.5, 4). We calculate a = 18.22 and rA = 17.78.
The six solutions of (41) are given by
ϕ1 = −2.9596
ϕ2 = −2.8573
ϕ3 = 0.0001
ϕ4 = 0.0001
ϕ5 = 0.2254
ϕ6 = 0.2186.
By evaluating these solutions using (42) we have that the
optimal solution is ϕ∗ = 0.2186, which yields I∗ =
(0.8676, 3.8555). The trajectories are shown in Fig. 6. Note
that the same trajectories and optimal interception point are
obtained by using the numerical method from Sec. III.
Example 2. Target is inside the DA Apollonius circle. The
speed ratios are α = 0.5 and γ = 0.93. The initial conditions
of the three agents are given by: A = (6, 0), D = (−6, 0),
and T = (3.1, 2.7). In this case we calculate a = 82.823
and rA = 82.605. Since the Target is initially inside the
DA Apollonius circle, the critical speed ratio α¯ is greater
than zero. We can use eq. (31) to find the exact value of
the critical speed ratio which is α¯ = 0.436. Thus, the value
α = 0.5 > α¯ guarantees the Target’s escape. Now we can
search for the optimal angle ϕ∗ that solves the differential
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Fig. 6. Optimal trajectories in Example 1
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Fig. 7. Optimal trajectories in Example 2
game. The six solutions of eq. (41) are given by
ϕ1 = −3.0752
ϕ2 = −3.1189
ϕ3 = −0.0014
ϕ4 = −0.0014
ϕ5 = 0.0277
ϕ6 = 0.0429.
By evaluating these solutions using eq. (48) we have that
the optimal solution is ϕ∗ = 0.0429, which yields I∗ =
(0.293, 3.539). The trajectories are shown in Fig. 7. Note
that the same trajectories and optimal interception point are
obtained by using the numerical method from Sec. III.
Example 3. Robustness to unknown Attacker guidance
law. A very important characteristic of the cooperative
guidance laws for the active target defense differential game
as discussed in this paper is that the solution given by
the sixth order equation (41) is a closed-loop interception
strategy that is robust to unknown Attacker guidance laws.
This means that if the Attacker does not follow its optimal
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Fig. 8. Trajectories in Example 3
policy and uses a different guidance law that is unknown to
the Target-Defender team then the Target and the Defender
(having current measurements of the Attacker’ position) are
able to solve (41) and continuously update their cooperative
interception strategy, thus increasing the T −A separation at
interception time.
Let the initial positions of the three agents be: A = (10, 0),
D = (−10, 0), and T = (3, 7.5). The speed ratios are α =
0.6 and γ = 0.85. The Attacker implements PN guidance
law with navigation constant N=3. However, this information
is unknown to the Target-Defender team and they are only
able to measure the current position of the Attacker, A =
(xA(t), yA(t)). By continuously updating their headings, the
Target-Defender team are able to defeat the Attacker, that is,
the Defender intercepts the Attacker and the Target escapes
being captured by the Attacker. The trajectories for this
example are shown in Fig. 8. The final separation between
Target and Attacker is R(tf ) = 5.609 > J∗. As expected,
the final separation is more than if the Attacker played
optimally. When the Attacker plays optimally the cost/payoff
is J∗ = 5.373.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A numerical and an analytical solution to the active
target defense differential game with a fast Defender were
presented in this paper. The numerical solution is based
on the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle applied to the dif-
ferential game and a TPBVP is solved numerically. The
analytical approach hinges on the solutions of a sixth-order
polynomial equation that provides the optimal interception
point’s coordinates, hence it provides the optimal headings
for the players. This result comes with an expected increase
in complexity compared to the case where both missiles are
restricted to have the same speed [23]. In that case, the
solution of the differential game required the rooting of a
fourth-order polynomial.
REFERENCES
[1] W. Scott and N. E. Leonard, “Pursuit, herding and evasion: A three-
agent model of caribou predation,” in American Control Conference,
2013, pp. 2978–2983.
[2] D. W. Oyler, P. T. Kabamba, and A. R. Girard, “Pursuit-evasion games
in the presence of a line segment obstacle,” in IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control, 2014.
[3] H. Huang, W. Zhang, J. Ding, D. M. Stipanovic, and C. J. Tomlin,
“Guaranteed decentralized pursuit-evasion in the plane with multiple
pursuers,” in 50th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and
European Control Conference, 2011, pp. 4835–4840.
[4] E. Bakolas and P. Tsiotras, “Optimal pursuit of moving targets using
dynamic voronoi diagrams,” in 49th IEEE Conference on Decision
and Control, 2010, pp. 7431–7436.
[5] R. L. Boyell, “Defending a moving target against missile or torpedo
attack,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol.
AES-12, no. 4, pp. 522–526, 1976.
[6] ——, “Counterweapon aiming for defence of a moving target,” IEEE
Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol. AES-16, no. 3,
pp. 402–408, 1980.
[7] P. Zarchan, Tactical and strategic missile guidance. AIAA Progress
in Aeronautics and Astronautics, Reston, VA, 1997, vol. 176.
[8] G. Siouris, Missile guidance and control systems. New York, Springer,
2004.
[9] A. Ratnoo and T. Shima, “Line-of-sight interceptor guidance for
defending an aircraft,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics,
vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 522–532, 2011.
[10] T. Yamasaki and S. N. Balakrishnan, “Triangle intercept guidance
for aerial defense,” in AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control
Conference. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
2010.
[11] T. Yamasaki, S. N. Balakrishnan, and H. Takano, “Modified command
to line-of-sight intercept guidance for aircraft defense,” Journal of
Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 898–902, 2013.
[12] S. Rubinsky and S. Gutman, “Three body guaranteed pursuit and eva-
sion,” in AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, 2012,
pp. 1–24.
[13] ——, “Three-player pursuit and evasion conflict,” Journal of Guid-
ance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 98–110, 2014.
[14] A. Perelman, T. Shima, and I. Rusnak, “Cooperative differential games
strategies for active aircraft protection from a homing missile,” Journal
of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 761–773,
2011.
[15] I. Rusnak, “The lady, the bandits, and the bodyguards–a two team
dynamic game,” in Proceedings of the 16th World IFAC Congress,
2005.
[16] I. Rusnak, H. Weiss, and G. Hexner, “Guidance laws in target-missile-
defender scenario with an aggressive defender,” in Proceedings of the
18th IFAC World Congress, vol. 18, no. Pt 1, 2011, pp. 9349–9354.
[17] A. Ratnoo and T. Shima, “Guidance strategies against defended aerial
targets,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 35, no. 4,
pp. 1059–1068, 2012.
[18] T. Shima, “Optimal cooperative pursuit and evasion strategies against a
homing missile,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 34,
no. 2, pp. 414–425, 2011.
[19] V. Shaferman and T. Shima, “Cooperative multiple-model adaptive
guidance for an aircraft defending missile,” Journal of Guidance,
Control, and Dynamics, vol. 33, no. 6, pp. 1801–1813, 2010.
[20] O. Prokopov and T. Shima, “Linear quadratic optimal cooperative
strategies for active aircraft protection,” Journal of Guidance, Control,
and Dynamics, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 753–764, 2013.
[21] E. Garcia, D. W. Casbeer, K. Pham, and M. Pachter, “Cooperative
aircraft defense from an attacking missile,” in 53rd IEEE Conference
on Decision and Control, pp. 2926-2931, 2014.
[22] E. Garcia, D. W. Casbeer, K. Pham, and M. Pachter, “Cooperative air-
craft defense from an attacking missile using proportional navigation,”
in 2015 AIAA Guidence, Navigation, and Control Conference, Paper
AIAA 2015-0337, 2015.
[23] M. Pachter, E. Garcia, and D. W. Casbeer, “Active target defense differ-
ential game,” in 52nd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control, and Computing, pp. 46-53, 2014.
